

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 126580
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

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P: G MOOSE
NEA:WCRAWFORD
S/S-O. FEISCHER

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O R 200117Z MAY 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
INFO HORN OF AFRICA COLLECTIVE
XMT AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

S E C R E T STATE 126580

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SA, US, SO, MASS

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION OF HORN ISSUES DURING PRINCE SAUD
VISIT

SUMMARY: PORTION OF APRIL 18 CONSULTATIONS WITH VISITING
SAUDI FONMIN PRINCE SAUD DEVOTED TO HORN ISSUES, IN WHICH
UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE
SPOKE FOR US SIDE, WAS MARKED BY STRONG AND REPEATED
SAUDI EMPHASIS ON SOVIET THREAT AS CENTRAL FEATURE OF
HORN SITUATION. SAUD FELT IT WAS MISTAKE TO SEEK SIAD'S
RENUNCIATION OF GREATER SOMALIA AS PRE-CONDITION FOR
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US AID. US SIDE STRESSED MULTIPLE CONSIDERATIONS US
MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING PROBLEM OF CONTINUED
SOMALI SUPPORT FOR OGADEN INSURGENTS AND KENYAN FEARS OF
SOMALIA. ON ERITREA, SAUD AGREED THAT UN ROLE IN SEARCH
FOR RESOLUTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT
DEPUTY FONMIN MANSOURI WOULD COME TO WASHINGTON FOR
CONTINUED EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY.

1. PRINCE SAUD EXPLAINED SAUDI VIEW THAT BASIC THREAT IN HORN REGION STEMS FROM SOVIET INTERVENTION THROUGH USE OF SEVERAL STATES INCLUDING CUBA, PDRY, AND SEVERAL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. SAUDIS SEE NEED FOR RESPONSE FROM US. MR. NEWSOM ASSURED SAUD OF US CONCERN OVER

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AREA, BUT NOTED THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT OFTEN RESULTED FROM OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED TO THEM, AS IN ETHIOPIA (THROUGH LACK OF REFORMS UNDER PREVIOUS REGIME) AND SOMALIA (THROUGH OGADEN INCURSION). MR. NEWSOM SAID US FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO GIVE ARMS TO SOMALIA UNLESS SOMALIS GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT SUPPORT OGADENI INSURGENTS.

2. SAUD SUGGESTED THAT US SHOULD HELP SOMALIA FIRST AND THEN SEE IF LONG-STANDING OGADEN PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED. OGADEN PROBLEM DID NOT BECOME AN ISSUE UNTIL SOVIETS MADE IT ONE. SAUD FELT IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT SIAD TO RENOUNCE GREATER SOMALIA SINCE THIS WAS ASKING HIM TO DESTROY HIMSELF AND BEFORE DOING THAT HE WOULD LOOK ELSEWHERE.

3. MR. MOOSE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR US JUST TO OPPOSE THE SOVIETS. US MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OTHER FACTORS INCLUDING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS, RELATIONS WITH
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SOMALIA'S NEIGHBORS, AND AFRICA-WIDE CONSIDERATIONS. HOWEVER, IF SOMALIA WANTS TO CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPMENT AND LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, THEN THE US CAN HELP. MR. MOOSE SAID WE HAVE TOLD SIAD BARRE WE ARE PREPARED TO SEND A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM WHICH WILL PLACE EMPHASIS ON FIELDS OF ANTI-TANK DEFENSE, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT.

4. MR. NEWSOM NOTED US MAY NOT IN ANY EVENT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE EVERYTHING SOMALIA BELIEVES IT NEEDS FOR DEFENSE, AND ASKED WHAT SAUDI ARABIA PROPOSES TO DO AND WHETHER SAUDI AID WAS CONDITIONAL ON AID FROM US. SAUD SAID SAUDI ARABIA HAS ALREADY HELPED SOMALIA ACQUIRE ARMS, BASED ON SOMALI REQUIREMENTS AND NOT RELATED TO SOMALI ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHERS. NOR DOES SAUDI ARABIA ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH SOMALI CLAIMS ON THE OGADEN. SAUDI AID INCLUDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE BECAUSE OF THREAT FROM SOVIET UNION AND SOMALIA'S IMPORTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA.

5. MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT ONE FACTOR WE MUST CONSIDER IS OUR WISH TO HELP SOMALI IN A WAY WHICH WILL NOT RAISE KENYAN FEARS. EVEN AFTER THE OGADEN WAR, SOMALIA IS STILL WELL AHEAD OF KENYA MILITARILY, AND KENYAN CONCERNS

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TO KENYA IS NOT SOMALIA OR ITS CLAIMS, BUT SOVIET UNION
VIA ETHIOPIA.

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8. FOR KHARTOUM: TIME DID NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF
SUDAN. VANCE

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PAGE 01 STATE 126580
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARP:D M WINN

APPROVED BY:NEA: A GLASPIE

NEA/ARP:J W TWINAM

S/S-O:D ROBINSON

AF/E:R W BAKER

-----084207 231127Z /15

R 230345Z MAY 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

S E C R E T STATE 126580

EXDIS

FOL STATE 126580 SENT ACTION JIDDA KHARTOUM INFO
HORN OF AFRICA COLLECTIVE XMT JIDDA KHARTOUM MAY 20, 1978
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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8. FOR KHARTOUM: TIME DID NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF SUDAN. VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

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TAGS: MASS, PDEV, SA, US, SO, (AL SAUD, SAUD IBN FAYSAL), (NEWSOM, DAVID)
To: JIDDA KHARTOUM
Type: TE
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